Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
The main purpose of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on the relation between corporate ownership and …rms' productive e¢ciency. The key question in this area of research has traditionally been whether …rms with concentrated ownership are more productive than …rms with dispersed ownership. On the one hand, concentrated shareholdings can mitigate free rider problems of corporate control (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1986 ). On the other hand, concentrated ownership might also lead to the extraction of ine¢cient private bene…ts by controlling shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 1 A related and less investigated issue is whether the identity of block-holders matters in explaining …rms' performance in a corporate governance system characterized by a highly concentrated ownership structure. As documented among others by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), this feature is common in most developed as well as developing countries outside the Anglo-Saxon in ‡uence.
In this perspective, Italy is a very interesting case study. In fact, not only concentration of direct ownership is high but a substantial degree of variability in the identity of block-holders is observed. In fact, independent companies directly owned and managed by families coexist with …rms belonging to large organizations -usually structured as pyramidal business groups -and therefore directly owned by other companies (Bianco and Casavola, 1999) . In turn, these large organizations are led at the top by families (or coalitions of families), or multinational corporations or the State 2 . Contrary to independent companies where top managerial positions are usually held by family members, these large organizations are characterized -to di¤erent degrees -by the presence of externally appointed professional top managers. In these large organizations, the standard agency problem between block-holders and senior management is therefore expected to emerge and the incentive to monitor the management e¤ectively may in turn depend on the identity of the blockholder. Given these institutional features two relevant issues have to be addressed: i) whether independent …rms are more or less e¢cient than …rms which are members of larger organizations; ii) whether in large organizations the identity of ultimate ownership a¤ects …rms' performance.
To investigate these issues we apply stochastic production frontier techniques to a large panel of Italian manufacturing …rms for which qualitative information on …rms' form of ownership is available. Using the approach developed by Battese and Coelli (1995), we allow the ine¢ciency component of the production function to depend on observables including size and a set of dummy variables proxying for the identity of ultimate ownership. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates the paper by relating some institutional characteristics of Italian corporate governance with the received theoretical literature. Section 3 describes the data set -additional information is provided in the data appendixand summarizes the relevant descriptive statistics. In section 4 the empirical model is discussed whereas section 5 comments upon the main empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
Institutional Framework and Relevant Issues
As noted by Nickell (1997) , most of the recent empirical literature which analyses the impact of external factors on …rms' e¢ciency is grounded on the idea that e¢ciency is basically driven by managerial e¤ort. Indeed, the main task of corpo-rate governance is to align managers' objectives to shareholders' goals. In order to achieve this result, the main mechanisms are perceived to be internal control and management compensation. In turn, the incentive to incur the cost of setting e¤ective governance mechanisms is likely to depend on factors like the degree of ownership concentration and …rm's capital structure. For this reason, variables proxying for the degree of shareholder control are usually included in regressions aimed at explaining productivity di¤erentials together with measures of …nancial pressure. In addition to this, the stance of product market competition may also act as a complementary disciplinary device. 3 As already mentioned in the introduction, Italian companies are characterized by a high level of ownership concentration. According to Bianchi et al (1997) , in 1992 the largest shareholder of manufacturing companies owned on average approximately 66% of a company and the three largest shareholders owned more than 90%.
Another relevant feature of Italian corporate governance is that neither …nancial institutions nor the stock market play a major role in monitoring …rms' behavior. In fact, contrary to other bank-based systems, the role of banks and other …nancial institutions in equity …nancing is very limited and it is unusual for bankers to sit on the boards of directors of manufacturing …rms. Furthermore, the market for corporate control does not play an important role and the number of …rms which could be a target for hostile takeovers is fairly small. This is partly a consequence of the limited number of companies listed on the Milan stock exchange. In addition, it depends on the high degree of ownership concentration also among listed companies as well as on the di¤usion of cross-ownership and board interlocks. 4 Taken all these facts together, majority block-holders seem to be the natural candidates to behave as main active monitors in companies.
However, whether concentrated ownership leads to e¤ective cost reducing monitoring practices is an unsolved issue both theoretically and empirically. In fact, when ownership is concentrated what becomes crucial is the objective function of the majority blockholder which might deviate from the standard shareholders' value maximization assumption. For instance, managers in state owned …rms may have incentives not always consistent with cost minimization practices (e.g. employment expansion). Analogously, in privately held companies managers may act in the private interest of majority blockholders and therefore be associated in ine¢cient rent extraction (e.g. hiring a lazy relative or purchasing a loss-maker soccer club).
Given this institutional framework two relevant questions have to be answered.
Firstly, evidence has to be provided on whether externally appointed professional managers (in large organizations) are more likely to deviate from cost minimization rules than owners-managers (in independent companies). To isolate this e¤ect, the most promising empirical strategy is to compare independent …rms only with those …rms belonging to business groups whose ultimate owner is a family (or a coalition of families). Secondly, a related but separate issue is whether in large organizations (national privately owned business groups, state owned business groups, multinational corporations) the identity of ultimate ownership matters in explaining e¢ciency di¤erentials. This in turn has two competing explanations: on the one hand e¢ciency di¤erentials might depend on the fact that di¤erent types of owners may be characterized by di¤erent objective functions. On the other hand, even if the pursuit of e¢ciency is a common objective for all types of owners, they might di¤er in the ability to provide e¤ective monitoring and incentive schemes to the top management.
5 5 Another candidate explanation is grounded on the idea that it is performance that a¤ects 5 
Data and Descriptive Statistics
In this section we provide both a brief description of the unbalanced panel of Italian …rms used in this study and some summary statistics on the variables which enter our econometric model. Our panel is extracted from a wider data-set constructed by Ceris-Cnr by merging balance sheet data collected by Mediobanca, a large investment bank, with industry level data provided by ISTAT, the Italian Cen- (changes in) ownership structure trough the functioning of a competitive process which selects the most appropriate type of ultimate owner for each …rm. However, this "reverse causality" explanation seems unconvincing in the Italian context given the ine¤ectiveness of external market mechanisms, including the market for corporate control, driving the selection process. 6 More detailed information on the data-set can be found in the appendix or, for those familiar with the Italian language, in Margon et al. (1995) . 7 A threshold of 15 …rms has been used. Eliminated industries are Arti…cial Fibres (Nace 26), Wooden Products (Nace 46) and Miscellaneous industries (Nace 49).
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Lucchini, Marzotto, Merloni, Miroglio, Parmalat and Smi. 8 In these groups control is exercised by families, or at least by coalitions of shareholders where families play a major role, often through complex organizational pyramidal structures. However,
given the size and the complexity of these organizations, externally appointed professional managers often held senior positions in operational companies. As already mentioned in the previous section, this feature makes it possible to test whether concentrated ownership is an e¢cient disciplinary mechanism by comparing the eco- do not satisfy the requirements to be included in the …rst three categories. This category includes mainly independent companies, but …rms a¢liated to smaller and younger private national business groups can be also found. We have grouped these two types of …rms together since the smaller groups are more similar to the independent …rms in our sample than to the large business groups in terms of size and diversi…cation and, as a consequence, in the likely role played by externally appointed senior managers. Table 1 reports, separately for each industry, the sample mean and the standard deviation of the variables which enter the empirical model presented in section 4.
Output is measured by sales de ‡ated with the appropriate three-digit production price index. Materials are computed as the de ‡ated di¤erence between sales and 8 These groups represented the core of the private national industrial sector in the eighties and most of them have been ranked in the top positions in terms of consolidated sales since the …rst incomplete list of groups was published by Mediobanca in 1983. In addition, these are the only private groups with a consolidated turnover larger than 1000 billion Lira in 1990.
7 value added and the capital stock is constructed by applying the standard perpetual inventory technique to available accounting data. All these variables are expressed in 1980 billion lira. Finally, employment is de…ned as the number of employees at the end of …scal year. Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics (sample mean and standard deviation) on employment disaggregated not only by industry but also by type of ownership. Two comments are worth making at this stage. Firstly, the average size (measured as number of employees) of independent …rms is much lower than the average size of a¢liated …rms. This can be easily seen by comparing the …rst column (Independent) with each of the next three columns (State Owned Firms, Group Firms, Multinationals). Furthermore, this di¤erence cannot be exclusively attributed to a composition e¤ect since it holds across most industries. Secondly, even if there is no systematic ranking among our three types of a¢liated …rms, on average subsidiaries of foreign multinationals tend to be smaller than a¢liates both to privately and to state owned national groups. This descriptive evidence suggests that the type of ownership is not independently distributed from …rm size. This will be accounted for in the speci…cation of the ine¢ciency part of the model where size variables are included alongside ownership dummies in order to avoid potential biases due to the omission of relevant variables.
Methodological Issues
To test whether a statistical relation exists between …rms' technical ine¢ciency and the identity of ultimate ownership we apply stochastic production frontier techniques to our sample of …rms. 9 This approach, originally proposed by Aigner, During the eighties research e¤orts shifted towards the analysis of the determinants of e¢ciency di¤erentials. Initially, this task was tackled with the adoption of a two stage approach: after estimating ine¢ciency with a frontier technique, ine¢ciency scores were regressed on various explanatory variables using OLS. 10 The drawback of this procedure is that it contradicts the identical distribution assumption of the …rst stage. Recently, several authors have proposed di¤erent models for ine¢ciency e¤ects in stochastic frontier production functions. 11 In this study we adopt the approach suggested by Battese and Coelli (1995) who developed a stochastic production frontier approach suitable for panel data where ine¢ciency is modeled as an explicit function of a vector of …rm-speci…c variables and a random error.
We assume that for each industry technology is represented by the following ‡exible translogarithmic production function:
where y it denotes (the logarithm of) production for …rm i at time t, j = k = M; L; K; T is a vector including (the logarithms of) the material (M), labor (L) and capital (K) inputs together with a linear time trend (T ). v it are random variables which are assumed to be IIN » (0; ¾ 2 v ) and independent of the u it which are nonnegative random variables assumed to be independently distributed as truncations at zero of the N » (m it ; ¾ 2 ) distribution. The v it component of the error term captures measurement errors and production function misspeci…cation e¤ects, while the u it is related to technical ine¢ciency.
For our purposes we have parameterized m it as a linear function of size and ownership variables -including their interactions -which in our framework are expected to a¤ect …rms' e¢ciency:
where x Lit is our size measure for …rm i at time t, M it , G it , and S it are three dummy variables which are respectively equal to 1 (and 0 otherwise) if at time t …rm i is a subsidiary of a foreign Multinational, a member of a domestic private business Group or a State-owned …rm. T is a linear time trend which accounts for time varying e¢ciency e¤ects.
Given the speci…cation of the ine¢ciency model (2), independent …rms act as reference group and coe¢cients related to ownership dummies, together with their interactions with the size variable, show e¢ciency di¤erentials with respect to independent …rms. The ine¢ciency model (2) allows us to test whether the identity of ultimate owners matters in explaining e¢ciency di¤erentials. The size variables has been included in order to account for apparent size di¤erentials observed in the sample and discussed in Section 3. Size is measured as the log number of employees.
When, as in our speci…cation, inputs are also involved as explanatory variables for the ine¢ciency e¤ects, the stochastic frontier model is called a non-neutral model, as proposed by Huang and Liu (1994) and further considered by Battese and Broca (1997) . This model has important bearing upon the estimation of the elasticity of mean output with respect to the input variable included as explanatory variable in the ine¢ciency model.
12
In the stochastic model de…ned by (1) and (2) technical e¢ciency for …rm i at time t is de…ned as:
which takes a value lower than one unless a …rm is fully e¢cient. Technical e¢ciencies are predicted using the conditional expectations of exp(¡u it ) given the composed error term of the stochastic frontier (Battese and Coelli, 1988) .
Maximum likelihood method allows to simultaneously estimate the coe¢cients of the stochastic frontier production function (1) as well as of the ine¢ciency model (2) . In addition, variances parameters can be recovered on the basis of the following parameterization suggested by Battese and Coelli (1992) :°=
Finally, restrictions on parameters of the stochastic frontier function and of the ine¢ciency model can be tested using the following generalized likelihood ratio test statistic which has approximately a chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of parameters involved in the restriction : 12 In their 1997 paper, Battese and Broca derive the expression for the mean output elasticity with respect to input variable k for …rm i at time t as:
, Á and © are the density and the cumulative density functions of the standard normal variable. The …rst part of the above expression is referred as elasticity of frontier output and the second part as elasticity of technical e¢ciency.
where l(H 0 ) is the log-likelihood value of the restricted frontier model. Estimates are performed using the FRONTIER 4.1 software developed by Coelli (1996) .
Empirical results
In this section separate maximum likelihood estimates of the model de…ned in equations (1) and (2) are presented for twelve two-digit manufacturing industries. Providing a comprehensive analysis at the industry level is indeed one of the novelties of this paper. Among other things, it allows us to assess whether a common pattern in the ownership-e¢ciency relation exists across a broad spectrum of industries which di¤er with respect to several other characteristics including the speed of technological innovation and the stance of competition in the product market.
Simultaneous econometric estimates for the parameters of the frontier function and of the ine¢ciency model are reported in Table 3 . As it is well known, the parameters in the translog production function have no immediate economic interpretation. For this reason output elasticities with respect to materials, capital, labor and time have been computed at mean values of each variable and reported in Table   4 together with estimated standard errors. Rather comfortingly, most of estimated elasticities look economically sensible. In particular, material elasticity ranges from 0.659 ("O¢ce Machinery") to 0.842 ("Food and Drink"). Capital (0.028-0.119) and labor (0.106-0.512) elasticities di¤er considerably across industries, this in turn re ‡ecting substantial technological idiosyncracies. Among other things, this result casts more than a passing doubt on the methodological soundness of the common practice of estimating production functions on panels of …rms operating in di¤er-ent industries. "O¢ce Machinery" and "Textile and Clothing" exhibit substantial increasing returns to scale, whereas returns to scale turn out to be decreasing in "Rubber and Plastics". In all remaining industries returns to scale are close to unity. Finally, estimated elasticities of mean output with respect to time show the presence of moderate technical progress (0.001-0.013) in all industries but "Mechanical Engineering" where it is negative even if not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at conventional statistical levels.
As it can be seen in the upper part of Table 5 , the translog functional form with non-neutral technical progress seems an adequate representation of the technology.
In fact, reported generalized likelihood ratio tests strongly reject the restrictions imposed by the Cobb Douglas speci…cation (¯j k = 0 for j; k = M; K; L; T and j 6 = k) for all industries, thus con…rming that a ‡exible functional form, which let input and substitution elasticities depend on the data, provides a more appropriate description of the production process. Furthermore, the null hypotheses of no technical change (¯T =¯j T = 0 for j = M; K; L; T ) as well as of neutral technical change (¯M T = KT =¯L T = 0) are both rejected in all industries. Therefore, not only the estimated frontier functions shift over time but also the marginal rates of technical substitution are found to depend on time.
In the lower part of Table 5 are reported generalized likelihood ratio tests concerning restrictions imposed on the ine¢ciency model de…ned in equation (2) . The null hypothesis that each …rm is operating on the technical e¢ciency frontier (no ine¢ciency e¤ects) is strongly rejected in all industries. Therefore the traditional average response function is not an adequate representation of the data (Battese and Coelli (1995) ). Moreover, estimates of the variance parameter°reported at the bottom of Table 3 range between 0.41 to 0.94 and are all statistically di¤erent from zero. Hence the random component of the ine¢ciency e¤ects is signi…cant. In turn this implies that deviations from the best practice frontier are not entirely due 13 to noise and that stochastic ine¢ciency is present.
We now turn to the issue of whether observed ine¢ciency is a linear function of the explanatory variables included in the ine¢ciency model of equation (2) . As already mentioned, independent …rms are used as benchmark group. As a consequence, estimated coe¢cients on dummy variables -and their interactions with size -have to be interpreted as e¢ciency di¤erentials with respect to independent …rms.
The joint test of no ownership e¤ects, which involves restrictions on all ownership dummies and their interactions with size, is strongly rejected in all industries. This implies that, even after controlling for a common size e¤ect, membership to larger organizations has a widespread e¤ect on …rms' e¢ciency. To provide additional evidence on this issue, the same test is also applied separately to each sub-sample. The null hypothesis of no State owned di¤erential (± S = ± SL = 0) is always rejected at the 5% signi…cance level except for "O¢ce Machinery". Analogously, a¢liation to a national privately owned business group (± G = ± GL = 0) signi…cantly a¤ects e¢-ciency di¤erentials with respect to independent …rms in all industries but "Metals", "O¢ce Machinery" and "Transport Equipment". Finally, the null hypothesis of no foreign subsidiaries di¤erentials (± M = ± ML = 0) is also rejected in most industries.
Exceptions are "Metals", "Transport Equipment" and "Textiles and Clothing". 13 While informative, all tests presented so far su¤er from a major shortcoming since they do not allow us to identify the direction of e¢ciency di¤erentials. Additional evidence can therefore be provided by directly computing the e¢ciency di¤erentials from the benchmark of independent …rms. As robustness check, di¤er-entials have been evaluated both at the mean and at the median …rm size in each industry. Estimates and related standard errors are reported in Table 6 . Overall results can be summarized as follow. Firstly, if one focuses on punctual estimates state owned …rms turn out to be less e¢cient than their independent counterparts in all industries but "Rubber and Plastics". Furthermore, this exception is unlikely to be very reliable because of the small number of observations on state owned …rms in this industry (see the data appendix). Secondly, there is evidence that subsidiaries of foreign …rms tend to be more e¢cient than independent …rms. In fact, not only punctual estimates are negative -and therefore suggesting a positive di¤erential -in 7 out of 12 industries ("Mineral Products", "Chemicals", "Metal Products", "Mechanical Engineering", "O¢ce Machinery", "Food and Drink", Paper and Printing") but these negative estimates are all signi…cant at the 10% level independently on whether size is evaluated at the mean or at the median. On the contrary, when punctual estimates are positive, they are statistically signi…cant only for "Electrical Engineering". Thirdly, there is no systematic evidence for …rms a¢liated to national business groups. In fact, when size is evaluated at median values, punctual estimates point out that a¢liated …rms are more e¢cient than independent …rms exactly in 6 out of 12 industries. In addition, if one focuses only on industries where di¤erentials are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero, estimates are positive in "Metal products", "Mechanical Engineering" and "Rubber and Plastics" and negative in "Food and Drink", "Textiles and Clothing" and "Paper and Printing", thus con…rming the overall balance.
To provide a quantitative assessment of the di¤erentials analyzed so far, mean technical e¢ciency scores are reported in Tables 7 and 8. In particular Table 7 summarizes the results by type of ownership and industry, whereas in Table 8 Table 8 allow to enrich the overall picture. In fact, subsidiaries of multinational …rms are found to be the most e¢cient group of …rms in all size classes. Furthermore, even if it is true that e¢ciency is a negative function of size in all groups, this function turns out to be ‡atter for the sub-sample of foreign subsidiaries. The bottom line is that di¤erentials between foreign subsidiaries and national …rms are more pronounced when the analysis is restricted to medium-large …rms.
Conclusions
In the introduction we posed ourselves two questions to be addressed empirically.
Firstly, whether externally appointed managers are more likely to deviate from cost minimization rules than owners-managers in a country where direct ownership is concentrated. Secondly, whether the identity of ultimate owner matters in large organizations. To isolate the …rst issue, we proposed to compare independent …rms with …rms a¢liated to private national business groups, that is to organizations where the ultimate owner is still a family or a coalition where families play a relevant role. Our answer to the …rst question is that there is no systematic evidence supporting the existence of additional agency problems due to the presence of externally appointed top managers, when …rms directly managed by owners are used as benchmark.
As to the second issue, there is very strong evidence that in large organizations the identity of the ultimate owner matters. In fact, subsidiaries of multinational …rms are found to be the most e¢cient group in most industries whereas state owned …rms show systematic lower e¢ciency levels. It has to be pointed out that these results hold across a broad range of industries which di¤er in the speed of technological innovation as well as in the likely stance of product competition. This is an important result which makes the standard managerial e¤ort explanation for 16 e¢ciency di¤erentials much more convincing.
Which lessons can be drawn from these results? It would be tempting to conclude that privatizations are likely to bring e¢ciency gains. However, two caveats have to be borne in mind. Firstly, the methodology used in this paper assumes that the type of ownership is exogenous. This identi…cation assumption might be too restrictive and therefore one must be cautios in giving our estimates a causal (or structural) interepretation. Secondly, the size of these gains should not be over-emphasized. On average our estimates suggest that in the sample period under study di¤erentials amount at -3.04% and -6.78% respectively, depending on whether national private …rms or subsidiaries of foreign multinationals are used as comparison.
Another important …nding of this paper is that private national …rms (both independent and a¢liates to business groups) seem less successful than their foreign counterparts in designing appropriate incentive schemes and in implementing adequate monitoring devices. Also, this problem turns out to be more severe in large …rms. In turn, even if additional work in this area is obviously needed, these …ndings seem to suggest that a gap in managerial culture still exists in Italy and that multinational corporations are a potential vehicle for the di¤usion of "best practices".
[16] Kumbhakar, S.C., S. Ghosh and J.T. McGuckin (1991) Note to tables: a) All data are expressed in 1980 billion Lira with the exception of employment which refers to the number of employees at the end of …scal year; b) Standard deviations in small characters. 
Data Appendix
The panel of …rms used in this paper was constructed by using "Le Principali Società Italiane" directory, published yearly by Mediobanca Investment Bank. Each release of this directory includes balance sheet data for two consecutive years for a variable number of medium-large sized companies. Over the 1977-93 period the total number of …rm-year observations amounts at 23761. Time series were obtained by merging data coming from several releases. The outcome of this operation is an unbalanced panel of 3982 …rms with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 17 observations. From Mediobanca directories, information is available on the occurrence of extraordinary operations including major mergers, acquisitions or divestments. Since in these cases balance sheet data are unlikely to be comparable with data from either the previous or the following year, observations in years where an extraordinary operation occurred are excluded from the sample. For the purpose of the present paper …rms outside manufacturing as well as manufacturing …rms with less than 4 observations have also been excluded. At the end of this cleaning process we are left with an unbalanced panel of 1306 …rms and 9816 …rm-year observations. 
